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1. INTRODUCTION
Nations constantly confront potential threats to their sover-
eignty and their right to political self-determination. During the
past few decades, the rise of multinational corporations ("MNCs")
and increases in foreign investment have replaced military force as
the chief sources of such threats. As MNCs and other foreign
enterprises expand their activities abroad, they generally seek to
influence the domestic policies of the nations in which they do
business.' This growing foreign political influence has caused the
leaders of many countries to fear that their nations' political and
economic independence are at risk.2
One way in which overseas corporations try to affect the
domestic affairs of their host countries is through campaign
contributions. A company may make a campaign donation "to
protect [itself] against the passage of adverse laws and regulations
by foreign governments."3 A foreign corporation contributes to
the campaigns of candidates who support policies that are
favorable to the its financial welfare.
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1 See Martin Tolchin & Susan Tolchin, Foreign Money, U.S. Fears, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 1987, 6 (Magazine), at 63 [hereinafter Foreign Money]
(discussing the efforts of foreign investors to influence politics in the United
States).
2 See Martin Tolchin, Foreigners' Political Roles in U.S. Grow by Investing,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1985, at Al [hereinafter Foreigners' Political Roles].
I NEIL H. JACOBY ET AL., BRIBERY AND EXTORTION IN WORLD BusINEss
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The domestic concern is that these foreigners are buying
influence in the nation's internal policy-making process. Govern-
ments have attempted to resolve this problem by adopting legisla-
tion that prohibits foreign individuals, corporations, and govern-
ments from contributing to the campaigns of domestic candi-
dates.4 The United States enacted such a ban in 1976. Other
countries recently have enacted similar prohibitions.6 Nations
generally justify these restrictions by claiming that foreign
campaign contributions threaten their right to maintain their
sovereignty, determine their own laws, and elect their own
officials free of outside interference.7 They argue that foreigners
making significant campaign contributions affect election out-
comes and thus influence future policy decisions, since politicians
receiving generous donations from foreign interests are likely to
keep them in mind when casting votes in the future.' Policies
thus may cease to reflect the domestic polity's will and instead
reflect the preferences of overseas investors.9 Critics conclude
that foreign campaign contributions therefore subvert the goals of
4 See Lori F. Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and
Nonforcible Influence over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 21-28 (1989).
5 See 2 U.S.C. 5 441e (1994). The law was first adopted in 1976 as an
amendment to the Federal Election Campaign Act and was later recodified at
2 U.S.C. S 441e. See Daniel S. Savrin, Note, Curtailing Foreign Financial
Participation in Domestic Elections: A Proposal to Reform the Federal Election
Campaign Act, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 783, 794-95 (1988) (discussing the legislative
history of 2 U.S.C. S 441e).
6 See Damrosch, supra note 4, at 25-28. See also discussion infra Section 3.
7 See Savrin, supra note 5, at 784-89. Governments may even attempt to
conceal their efforts to influence elections in other countries by encouraging
private actors, such as corporations and labor unions, to make contributions to
overseas campaigns. See Damrosch, supra note 4, at 15-16. Although the
government orders such contributions, it hopes that the international
community will view them as private donations instead of as an attempt by the
regime to interfere with the sovereignty of another nation. See id. at 15.
' See Savrin, supra note 5, at 789, 809 (arguing that foreign campaign
contributions have caused politicians to place foreign interests ahead of their
constituents' interests when making policy). For instance, during the 1996 U.S.
Presidential campaign, Republicans accused President Bill Clinton of altering
his trade and human rights policies toward Indonesia in exchange for nearly
one million dollars in campaign contributions from two wealthy Indonesian
families with ties to a major financial-services company. See David E. Sanger,
Clinton Officials Seeking to Defend Indonesian Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1996,
at Al.
9 See id.
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a democratic system.1" In addition, opponents of the inflow of
overseas funds assert that excessive contributions may undermine
the legitimacy of a government by causing the public to believe
that their elected leaders have negotiated certain quid pro quo
arrangements with foreigners in exchange for their contribu-
tions. 1
This Comment explores efforts to curb foreign political
influence by restricting campaign contributions and evaluates the
effectiveness and justifications of these regulations. Section 2
examines the U.S. prohibition against contributions from foreign
nationals and exposes the tremendous loophole created through
the Federal Election Commission's ("FEC" or "the Commission")
interpretation of this law. Section 3 surveys legislation enacted in
other countries to restrict campaign contributions from foreign
sources. Section 3 reveals that certain countries may implement
restrictions on foreign campaign financing in order to achieve
what most would consider to be undemocratic ends. Section 4
discusses the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"),12 the U.S.
legislation intended, in part, to prohibit bribery of foreign public
officials through campaign contributions and other payments.
Instead of restricting overseas donations to U.S. political candi-
dates, the FCPA focuses on barring U.S. companies from
contributing to foreign political campaigns if these donations
amount to bribes and are given with a corrupt purpose. Since the
FCPA targets only illicit payments by domestic corporations, it
differs from the other legislation discussed in this Comment. The
FCPA presents a unique alternative to the more common barriers
to outside contributions and is still the only national legislation
aimed at attacking the more general problem of international
bribery that plagues the world community. 3 Finally, Section 5
suggests that the justifications for prohibiting all foreign campaign
contributions should be re-examined and questioned due to the
increasingly interdependent and global nature of the world
economy. Section 5 argues that foreign corporations have a
'o See id. at 789-90.
t See id. at 809-10.
12 See 15 U.S.C. % 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff, 78m (1994).
13 See Stephen C. Muffler, Proposing a Treaty on the Prevention of
International Corrupt Payments: Cloning the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Is
Not the Answer, 1 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 3, 5 (1995).
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significant interest in the domestic policies of other countries and
thus may have a legitimate right to express these interests in some
manner. Section 5 proposes that instead of indiscriminately
outlawing all donations from abroad, countries should adopt the
FCPA's approach to defining an illegal campaign contribution by
focusing on eliminating only contributions made for corrupt
purposes, specifically payments that may be classified as explicit
bribes. Furthermore, Section 5 argues that only these types of
payments, not campaign contributions in general, truly subvert
democratic ideals. This Comment concludes that the international
community should direct its attention to attacking the more
serious and pervasive problem of international bribery instead of
instituting blanket prohibitions against all types of foreign
campaign contributions.
2. U.S. PROHIBITION ON FOREIGN CONTRIBUTIONS TO
DOMESTIC CAMPAIGNS
The United States first considered adopting legislation to
restrict foreign campaign contributions during the 1960s when
congressional hearings revealed that numerous foreign interests
had been donating funds to U.S. federal election campaigns
through agents in Washington, D.C.14 Philippine sugar manufac-
turers who wished to influence legislation concerning sugar
import quotas were among the major sources of these contribu-
tions." As a result of these hearings, Congress amended the
Foreign Agents Registration Act ("FARA")16 in 1966 by declar-
ing it a felony for a foreign principal to use an agent to contribute
to domestic election campaigns or for a candidate to accept or
solicit such contributions. 17 FARA defines an "agent of a foreign
principal" as "any person who acts ... under the direction or
control, of a foreign principal.""8
The language of this prohibition, however, still permitted
14 See Damrosch, supra note 4, at 21-22.
15 See id. at 22 & n.82.
16 22 U.S.C. SS 611-21 (1994).
" See Savrin, supra note 5, at 791. The prohibition was codified at 18
U.S.C. S 613 (1994). This provision was later repealed when the law was
revised. See F.E.C. Advisory Op. No. 1987-25 (Sept. 17, 1987).
18 22 U.S.C. S 611(c)(1) (1994).
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foreign principals to provide funds directly to candidates.19 Such
donations technically were legal because they were not distributed
through an agent. President Richard Nixon exploited this
loophole in his 1972 presidential election campaign by accepting
large amounts of overseas donations.0 When the Watergate
hearings exposed Nixon's reliance on foreign assistance, Congress
considered amending the prohibition.21 Congress specifically
addressed this issue during the 1974 debates concerning revisions
to the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA").' Texas
Senator Lloyd Bentsen proposed an amendment ("the Bentsen
Amendment") that would bar all foreign nationals, aside from
resident aliens, from making any contributions to domestic
campaigns. 23 Bentsen, concerned with the potential threat to
U.S. sovereignty, noted that he did "not think foreign nationals
have any business in our political campaigns. They cannot vote in
our elections so why should we allow them to finance our
elections? Their loyalties lie elsewhere; they lie with their own
countries and their own governments." 24  In 1976, Congress
granted the FEC jurisdiction to implement and enforce the
Bentsen Amendment, which was eventually recodified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441e.' Thus, by 1976, the United States had adopted legisla-
tion restricting campaign financing to only domestic sources.
Whether this limitation would be effective, however, remained in
question.
"9 See Damrosch, supra note 4, at 23.
20 See MAURICE H. STANS, THE TERRORS OF JUSTICE 182 (1978)
(defending the acceptance of foreign funding during the 1972 election
campaign). Nixon allegedly received $1.5 million from the Shah of Iran,
approximately $10 million from Arab interests, and $2 million from a wealthy
French man named Paul Louis Weiller. See id. at 183-84 (denying that Nixon's
campaign committee actually received these funds and arguing that such
allegations were false).
21 See Martin Tolchin, Foreign Role in U.S. Politics Questioned, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 1986, at B7 [hereinafter Foreign Role].
2 2 U.S.C. SS 431-56 (1994).
2' See Savrin, supra note 5, at 793.
24 120 CONG. REC. 8783 (1974).
See 2 U.S.C. S 441e (1994). See also Savrin, supra note 5, at 794-95
(discussing the FEC's role in enforcing and administering the Bentsen
Amendment).
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2.1. The Language of 2 U.S.C. § 441e
The current provision prohibiting overseas contributions
states:
It shall be unlawful for a foreign national directly or
through any other person to make any contribution of
money or other thing of value, or to promise expressly or
impliedly to make any such contribution, in connection
with an election to any political office or in connection
with any primary election, convention, or caucus held to
select candidates for any political office; or for any person
to solicit, accept, or receive any such contribution from a
foreign national.26
The statute states that the term "foreign national" includes any
"foreign principal" as defined in FARA.r According to this
definition, any foreign corporation "organized under the laws of
or having its principal place of business in a foreign country" is a
foreign principal and hence a foreign national.28 Thus, under the
law, corporations located abroad are not permitted to fund U.S.
election campaigns. As will be explained later, this method of
determining when a corporation is defined as a foreign national
creates a loophole allowing foreign enterprises to evade the law's
intent by channeling contributions through their U.S. subsidiar-
ies.29 The term, "foreign national" also includes foreign govern-
ments,3" foreign political parties,3" and individuals who are not
26 Id. S 441e(a).
27 Id. S 441e(b). The definition of a "foreign principal" appears at 22
U.S.C. S 611(b). This definition can produce ironic results. For instance, Eni
F.H. Faleomavaega, American Samoa's delegate in Congress, recently discovered
that the language of the statute prevented him from funding his own election
campaign expenses because, being a non-citizen, he is classified as a "foreign
nation and thus cannot contribute to a U.S. campaign. See American Samoa's
Election Law 'Quirk') POL. FIN. & LOBBY REP., Sept. 14, 1994, at 3.
28 See 22 U.S.C. S 611(b)(3).
29 See Donna M. Ballman, Political Campaign Contributions by Foreign
Nationals in Florida Elections, 65 FLA. B. J. 31, 32 (1991) (summarizing the
provisions of 2 U.S.C. § 441e).
30 See 22 U.S.C. S 611(b)(1).
31 See id.
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U.S. citizens and are "not lawfully admitted for permanent
residence."'3 2
The statute not only bars foreign nationals from donating
money to a candidate, but also prohibits them from contributing
any "other thing of value."33 This includes loans, gifts, deposits,
guarantees, subscriptions, and any type of security.14 Under the
law, both the foreign national and the U.S. citizen who receives
or solicits such a contribution may be liable. The provision
encompasses any person who solicits or accepts such contribu-
tions, regardless of whether he or she knows that the source of
the donation is foreign.3" By not limiting the scope of the
statute to only those who know that they are receiving foreign
money, Congress created a law that potentially could lead to
broad liability. For instance, members of a campaign committee
who send a mass mailing to a person who happens to be a foreign
national technically could be found to have violated the statute.3 6
The penalties for a violation, however, vary according to the mens
rea of the actor.37  The FEC is generally successful in convincing
the perpetrator to comply voluntarily with the penalty it imposes
and rarely needs to bring such cases to federal court.3"
It is important to note that 5 441e applies to contributions
made to campaigns in all elections, including races for federal,
312 2 U.S.C. S 441e(b)(2).
3 Id. S 441e(a).
3' See Ballman, supra note 29, at 32.
3 See id. at 33.
36 See id.
"' See id. If a person knowingly violates the prohibition, the FEC may fine
the perpetrator up to twice the amount of the contribution, but no more than
$10,000. See id. The FEC may also suggest that the U.S. Attorney General
criminally prosecute the violator. See id. The maximum criminal penalty is a
fine of three times the contribution up to $25,000 and one-year imprisonment.
See id. Generally, the treasurer of the campaign committee is the person who
is actually punished unless the candidate took part in or knew of the violations.
See id.
" See id. As a result of a recent investigation, Hyundai Motor America,
Korean Airlines, and Samsung America, Inc. all pleaded guilty to violating the
FECA by contributing to California Congressman Jay Kim's 1992 campaign.
These three Korean-based companies received approximately $1 million in fines.
See Samsung America Pleads Guilty to Political Contribution Violations, Fined
$150,000, 2-7-96 West's Legal News 653, 1996 WL 258408, available in Westlaw,
TP-ALL Database.
1996]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
state, and local offices.39 This broad scope reflects the congressio-
nal intent to exclude foreign interference in local as well as in
federal politics.
2.2. The Loophole
The FEC largely has thwarted the goal of the Bentsen
Amendment through its numerous opinions that consistently have
interpreted § 441e as allowing domestic subsidiaries of foreign
corporations to make contributions to favored candidates. 
4
Despite the fact that the domestic subsidiary may be foreign-
controlled or even wholly-owned by its foreign parent, the statute
does not define it as a foreign national because it is chartered in
the United States and has its principal place of business in the
United States.41 Therefore, § 441e does not regulate the political
activities of a subsidiary with a foreign parent.
Subsidiaries wishing to support U.S. candidates generally
establish political action committees ("PACs"),42 which solicit
and collect contributions from the subsidiary's U.S. employees
and often from its stockholders. 43 Although the United States
prohibits all corporations from directly contributing to federal
campaigns, the FECA does permit domestic corporations to
sponsor the establishment and administration of PACs, which
may donate the money they collect to federal candidates who
support policies which promote their corporation's business
interests.44 Corporate PACs may contribute up to $5,000 to a
candidate's campaign.45
" See 2 U.S.C. S 441e(a). The FEC recently fined a Hawaiian subsidiary
of a Japanese company $57,000 for using funds obtained from foreign nationals
to support Hawaiian non-federal candidates. See Japanese-Backed Firm Fined in
Campaign Case, Reuters, Sept. 30, 1994, available in Westlaw, INTLNEWS
Database.
40 See Savrin, supra note 5, at 783.
41 See, e.g., F.E.C. Advisory Op. No. 1992-16, reprinted in 2 Fed. Election
Campaign Fin. Guide (CCH) 6059 (June 26, 1992); F.E.C. Advisory Op. No.
1990-8, reprinted in 2 Fed. Election Campaign Fin. Guide (CCH) 5986 (une
18, 1990).
41 PACs are sometimes also referred to as "separate segregated funds."
43 See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 649 (1984) (discussing the operation
of corporate PACs); Savrin, supra note 5, at 796-97.
44 See Savrin, supra note 5, at 796-97.
41 See 2 U.S.C. S 441a(a)(2)(A) (1994). The impact of these corporate PACs
on the U.S. electoral system cannot be understated. PACs associated with
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Close to 100 foreign-controlled PACs actively support U.S.
political campaigns.46 PACs sponsored by foreign-owned or
foreign-controlled corporations contributed over $3.1 million to
1992 congressional campaigns. 47  This amount marked a signifi-
cant increase from the $2.4 million contributed during the 1989-90
election cycle.48 The MNCs making these contributions included
Toyota, Shell Oil, and British Petroleum, all of which have U.S.
subsidiaries. 49 These large conglomerates generally contribute to
the campaign chests of senior members of the House Ways and
Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee because
these are the politicians who most influence U.S. trade and tax
policy ° By supporting incumbents, foreign subsidiaries present
an additional hurdle for challengers to overcome in their election
bids.
Although the FEC permits foreign corporations to funnel
contributions through their subsidiaries' PACs, the Commission
places certain restrictions on this practice.51 For instance, the
FEC prohibits foreign nationals from participating in or influenc-
ing the PAC's activities.52 No foreign national may "direct,
dictate, control, or directly or indirectly participate in the
decision-making process of any ... political [action] commit-
tee."53 The FEC requires foreign nationals who are members of
the subsidiary's board to abstain from voting on PAC-related
issues, such as the election of the individuals responsible for
corporate interests spent approximately $64.4 million to support congressional
candidates seeking office in 1994. See Telephone Interview with Ian Stirton,
Member, Press Information Division of the FEC (Aug. 30, 1996).
46 See Craig Karmin, Foreign PACs Break Record, THE HILL, Sept. 21, 1994,
at 1. Five of the top ten foreign PAC contributors during the 1994 congres-
sional campaigns were pharmaceutical companies interested in influencing any
potential health care reform efforts. See id.
"' See Foreign-Connected PACs Increased Gifts in '92 Races, POL. FIN. &
LOBBY REP., Jan. 12, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Foreign PACs Increased Gifs].
48 See id.
49 See Hearings on Campaign Finance Reform Before the Comm. on House
Oversight, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Marcy
Kaptur) [hereinafter Hearings on Campaign Finance Reform].
50 See PAT CHOATE, AGENTS OF INFLUENCE 110 (1990). See also Foreign
Mone, supra note 1, at 67-68 (referring to certain foreign-owned companies
which employed PACs to contribute to the 1986 congressional campaigns).
51 See 11 C.F.R. S 110.4(a)(3) (1994).
52 See id.
53 Id.
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operating the committee. 54 In addition, the PACs of foreign
subsidiaries may not solicit or receive contributions from foreign
nationals.55 To receive such donations would violate § 441e.56
Furthermore, the FEC has ruled that a subsidiary which receives
most of its funding from its foreign parent and produces little
income from its U.S. operations may not operate a PAC because
the foreign parent essentially would be directly funding that
PAC.57 Through these restrictions, the FEC attempts to narrow
the loophole by reducing the extent to which foreigners can
exercise control over PACs.
The loophole remains wide, however, in some settings. For
instance, in certain states, subsidiaries with foreign parents may
make direct contributions from their treasuries to candidates
running for state or local office since the FECA prohibits such
direct donations only when they are made to federal candidates. 8
Thus, in states that permit corporations to support local cam-
paigns, U.S. subsidiaries can contribute to state campaigns without
even establishing a PAC.59 Again, § 441e does not restrict the
subsidiaries' activities because they are not considered foreign
nationals. 60 As with PAC contributions, however, the FEC has
required that no foreign national influence the subsidiary's
decisions concerning campaign contributions.61 In addition, the
subsidiary may use only the profits from its U.S. operations to
make donations to state and local campaigns.62 The parent
cannot provide the funds and may not just "replenish all or any
portion of the subsidiary's political contributions."
63
14 See F.E.C. Advisory Op. No. 1995-15 (June 30, 1995); F.E.C. Advisory
Op. No. 1990-8, reprinted in 2 Fed. Election Campaign Fin. Guide (CCH)
5986 (June 18, 1990).
55 See id.
56 See 2 U.S.C. S 441e(a).
" See F.E.C. Advisory Op. No. 1989-20, reprinted in 2 Fed. Election
Campaign Fin. Guide (CC-) 5970 (Nov. 16, 1989).
58 See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a).
'9 See, e.g., Foreign Money, supra note 1, at 68 (stating that foreign-owned
domestic companies can contribute directly to local campaigns in California).
60 See F.E.C. Advisory Op. No. 1982-10, reprinted in 1 Fed. Election
Campaign Fin. Guide (CCH-I 5651 (Mar. 29, 1982).
61 See F.E.C. Advisory Op. No. 1992-16, reprinted in 2 Fed. Election
Campaign Fin. Guide (CCH) 6059 (June 20, 1992).
62 See id.
63 Id.
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Many critics feel that permitting foreign-owned companies
located in the United States to support federal candidates through
PACs and to directly contribute to local campaigns runs contrary
to the true intent of the legislation. 64 Such critics of the FEC's
liberal interpretation of § 441e argue that foreign parents are
bound to influence the activities and decisions of their subsidiar-
ies.6' The original proponent of the amendment, Senator
Bentsen, has insisted that the foreign parent "will obviously
dictate to the subsidiary on how its PAC will be used.
" 66
Although only domestic sources can donate money to the
committee, how that money is spent certainly will reflect overseas
corporate interests.6 FEC Commissioner Thomas E. Harris, a
consistent dissenter in FEC opinions in this area, argues:
The PAC is always controlled by the top management of
the corporation. By permitting foreign nationals to
incorporate in the U.S. and thereby avoid the prohibitions
of Section 441e . . . , the commission does a great disser-
vice to the congressional intention to keep foreign influ-
ence out of federal elections in the [United States]. The
notion that no decisions as to the activities of the proposed
political [action] committee will be dictated or directed by
foreign nationals strikes me as extremely naive.68
The majority of the FEC, however, has justified its position by
claiming that PACs are actually "instruments of the United States
employees of foreign-owned companies" and thus prohibiting the
establishment of these PACs "would deprive United States citizens
of their right to make company-based contributions to political
candidates. "69
6 See Savrin, supra note 5, at 808 (arguing that the conflict between the
FEC's decisions and the original congressional intent behind the Bentsen
Amendment generates an incoherent policy).
65 See Foreigners' Political Roles, supra note 2, at A14.
66 Id.
67 See Foreign Role, supra note 21, at B7.
68 MARTIN ToLcHIN & SuSAN TOLCHIN, BUYING INTO AMERICA 19
(1988) [hereinafter BUYING INTO AMERIcA].
69 Martin Tolchin, U.S. Elections Got More Foreign Cash, N.Y. TIMES, May
24, 1987, § 1, at 21 [hereinafter U.S. Elections Got More Foreign Cash].
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Opponents to the current administratively-created loophole
suggest that such a lenient policy threatens U.S. sovereignty by
permitting foreign interests to influence domestic campaigns and
policy-making.70 These critics believe that foreign nationals have
no right to exercise such influence." Those who advocate
dosing this loophole, however, fail to acknowledge that foreign
nationals may have legitimate concerns about future U.S. policies
which could greatly affect the profitability of their subsidiaries.
By conducting business in the United States, creating jobs for U.S.
citizens, and subjecting themselves to U.S. laws, these foreign
corporations may indeed earn the right to exercise a certain level
of influence in U.S. politics. Section 5 of this Comment explores
this argument in greater detail.
Even if the United States eliminates the loophole, foreign
interests may continue to affect U.S. campaigns through other
avenues. For instance, foreign corporations may strongly
encourage their agents in the United States, such as law firms,
investment banks, and public relations companies, to establish
PACs aimed at supporting particular candidates.72 Alternatively,
foreign manufacturers may urge their U.S. dealers and sellers to
sponsor PACs which will contribute to favored candidates. 3
The creation of such PACs might even be a condition for
conducting business with the foreign enterprise. Thus, it is
unlikely that opponents of the existing loophole ever will be able
to achieve their goal of totally eliminating foreign influence in
domestic campaigns.
Candidates often complain that they do not realize that the
sources of their campaign contributions are affiliated with foreign
interests. 4 With the recent increase in the number of MNCs
and the growth of our interdependent global economy, it is often
70 See Savrin, supra note 5, at 807-08.
71 See U.S. Elections Got More Foreign Cash, supra note 69, at 21.
72 See CHOATE, supra note 50, at 110.
71 See id. An example of such a PAC is the Auto Dealers and Drivers for
Free Trade PAC ("AUTOPAC"). American vehicle importers established
AUTOPAC to lobby for free trade policies. See id. at 110-11. Foreign
automobile manufacturers encourage their dealers to help fund and participate
in AUTOPAC. See id. at 111. AUTOPAC often expends its money to defeat
candidates who advocate protectionist measures. See id.
74 See, e.g., Foreigners' Political Roles, supra note 2, at A14 (describing a
campaign manager's surprise at discovering that he had accepted a contribution
from the PAC of a company owned by a confidant of Ferdinand Marcos).
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difficult to determine the extent of foreign ownership of a
company.75 Thus, when a candidate receives a contribution from
a domestic company's PAC, he or she may not realize that this
company is actually owned by a Japanese or Swiss conglom-
erate.76 This ignorance is problematic because candidates have
the right to know the true identity of their financial supporters.
In addition, voters are entitled to know exactly who is funding
the candidates. An individual may cast his vote very differently
if he discovers that a candidate received most of his or her funding
from a foreign-owned entity. This problem will continue to grow
as more companies take advantage of this loophole in the future.
2.3. Proposals to Close the Loophole
There have been efforts to revise the election laws in order to
eliminate the existing loophole. Disappointed that his original
amendment did not produce its intended effect of eliminating
foreign influence in domestic campaigns, Senator Bentsen
proposed a new amendment in 1990 that would have prohibited
campaign contributions from any corporation with more than
50% foreign ownership.' This amendment would have barred
foreign-owned subsidiaries from making the donations which are
currently so common. Initially, the Senate overwhelmingly
approved the reform by a 73-27 vote.78  Congress, however,
failed in that year to pass the extensive campaign finance reform
legislation that included this amendment.79  When Bentsen
reintroduced the proposal the following year, the Senate voted 60-
35 against it.80
The FEC also considered adopting a rule banning foreign-
connected PAC contributions in 1990, but foreign-owned
companies responded with a vigorous lobbying campaign in
75 See id.
76 See id.
' See Richard Katz, Furor over Foreign Lobbying Fizzles in Washington,
JAPAN ECON. J./NIKKEI WKLY., Sept. 7, 1991, at 10. See also Senator Pursues
Ban on Political Donations by Foreign Interests, FIN. POST, July 18, 1990, at 6
(discussing Bentsen's proposed amendment and his attempt to include it in the
1990 Senate bill to reform campaign financing).
78 See Katz, supra note 77.
71 See Foreign PACs Increased Gifts, supra note 47, at 3.
go See Katz, supra note 77.
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opposition to the proposed regulation. 1 FEC Commissioner
John Warren McGarry commented on the emphatic reaction
sparked by this rule: "Never before in the FEC's history has
another question raised as much interest, emotion or impor-
tance."82 These foreign companies achieved their goal when the
FEC voted 4-2 to reject the suggested regulation and decided to
maintain its existing policy. 3 The tremendous outcry caused by
the proposal demonstrates how much value foreign entities place
on their ability to influence U.S. election outcomes. These MNCs
clearly feel that they have important interests at stake and want
to preserve their ability to support certain candidates. Viewed in
this manner, foreign corporations are not very different from
domestic interest groups who also strive to maintain their political
influence in order to protect their economic welfare.
The most recent attempt at reform in this area is the bill that
Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur presented to the House of
Representatives in October 1995.84 This proposal is similar to
Bentsen's in that it would outlaw contributions from PACs
sponsored by corporations with over 50% foreign-ownership."
The bill places the same restriction on PACs sponsored by trade
associations which receive a majority of their funding from
foreign companies.8 6 In addition, the bill addresses the problem
of identifying funds derived from foreign sources by requiring that
all corporate PACs disclose the extent to which their corporation
is foreign-owned. 7 Since Republicans thus far have displayed
little support for this bill, it does not appear that it will be adopt-
ed.88 The bill is currently sitting in the House Committee on
"1 See Foreign PACs Increased Gifts, supra note 47, at 5 ("[T]he FEC's
rulemaking exercise triggered intense interest among foreign-owned corpora-
tions who feared they would suffer economic disadvantages if unable to
compete alongside domestic corporations in the political finance arena."). The
FEC's legal staff, however, supported the proposed rule. See id.
82 Id.
83 See id. In 1991, the FEC again voted 4-2 to uphold a ruling which
permitted contributions from PACs sponsored by subsidiaries of foreign-owned
companies. See Karmin, supra note 46, at 10.
84 See H.R. 2499, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
85 See id.; Hearings on Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 49.
86 See Hearings on Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 49.
87 See id.
88 See Telephone Interview with representative of Congresswoman Marcy
Kaptur's office (July 18, 1996).
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Oversight. 9
Although Congress and the FEC have continued to allow
foreign-owned corporations to exploit the loophole created by the
language of § 441e, the numerous attempts to close this loophole
suggest that the future trend will be towards tightening, or at least
trying to tighten, the restrictions on foreign financing of domestic
campaigns. This focus reflects the prevailing view that this
foreign influence represents an illegitimate intrusion upon U.S.
sovereignty and upon the right of U.S. citizens to select their own
leaders free of interference from outside parties. There are no
signs that the United States plans to reconsider its rationale for
prohibiting contributions from foreign nationals. To the
contrary; if legislators such as Senator Bentsen and Congresswom-
an Kaptur can garner more support, the only likely change in the
near future will be a movement towards a more restrictive policy
against foreign campaign contributions.
3. OTHER COUNTRIES' RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
Several nations have adopted campaign financing regulations
resembling § 441e.' Lawmakers often enacted these restrictions
partly in response to the numerous instances of outside interfer-
ence in their internal political affairs. 1 Like the United States,
these countries generally justify their laws by claiming that they
are necessary to preserve the nation's sovereignty.92  In certain
instances, oppressive regimes have used such regulations to
suppress potential challenges to the status quo.93
3.1. The International Trend Towards Prohibition
In her testimony before the House Committee on Oversight,
Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur argued in favor of her proposed
amendment94 to 5 441e by stating that many major trading
partners of the United States have more stringent restrictions on
89 See id.
9o See discussion infra section 3.1.
91 See Damrosch, supra note 4, at 21.
92 See id.
9' See discussion infra section 3.2.
94 See H.R. 2499, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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foreign contributions than does the United States." Nations
with blanket prohibitions against foreign donations include
Japan,96  India,97  Spain,98  Mexico,99  and China."°  Other
countries have adopted less strict limitations. For instance, Israel
employs a novel policy that differentiates foreign individuals from
foreign corporations: foreign individuals are permitted to make
contributions, but foreign corporations and partnerships may not
directly or indirectly provide financial support to a political
party. 1 Germany also tolerates some foreign political influence
by allowing companies based in other countries to contribute to
campaigns as long as they have more than 50% German owner-
ship.
10 2
Recently, other countries have followed the trend towards
barring foreign financing of domestic campaigns. In 1993, the
Canadians amended their Canada Elections Act to prohibit parties
and politicians from accepting political contributions from an
individual "who is not a Canadian citizen or a permanent
resident," from corporations that do "not carry on business in
Canada," and from "a foreign government or an agent of a foreign
government." 3 In July 1995, the Russian Central Electoral
9' See Hearings on Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 49.
96 Article 22-5 of the Political Funds Control Law bars Japanese politicians
from receiving campaign funds from a foreign individual, a foreign corporation,
or any other entity which is mostly composed of foreigners. See LAW LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS, CAMPAIGN FINANCING OF NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN
SELECTED FOREIGN COUNTRIES 142 (1995).
' In 1976, India enacted The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act which
declares it unlawful for individuals or political groups to accept foreign political
contributions without first receiving permission from the Central Government.
See id. at 105.
98 Law 5/1985 on Political Parties bars donations from foreign individuals
and corporations. See id. at 178.
9' The 1990 Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures prohibits foreign
individuals, political parties, organizations, and corporations from financially
supporting Mexican candidates. See id. at 166.
10" See Hearings on Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 49.
101 See LAw LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 96, at 119; Damrosch, supra
note 4, at 26 (discussing the Israeli approach).
102 See LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 96, at 79. Germany also
allows donations from foreign political parties represented in the European
Parliament and from non-citizens who are members of the European
Parliament. See id.
103 Act of May 6, 1993, ch. 19, sec. 107, § 217.1(1)(a), (b), (e), 1993 S.C. 251,
311 (Can.).
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Commission approved regulations which prohibit foreign citizens
and governments from donating funds to candidates seeking
election to the State Duma, the Russian parliament's lower
house.' 1 The regulations also prohibit Russian companies from
contributing funds if foreigners own over 30% of the company's
capital.05 The fact thatRussia permits other domestic corpora-
tions to contribute directly to campaigns10 6 but prohibits foreign
corporate contributions suggests that the Russians are less
concerned with business exercising an undue amount of influence
on political outcomes than with maintaining their sovereignty and
freedom from outside political interference.
Great Britain is one of the few large countries which does not
explicitly restrict the inflow of contributions from abroad.0 7 A
recent controversy, however, has developed concerning the Tory
Party's acceptance of and reliance upon foreign funds.0 8 Oppo-
nents allege that the Tories have received millions of pounds in
secret donations from abroad.1°  The Labor Party has accused
the Tories of granting favorable tax treatment to foreigners in
exchange for their contributions.1 0  These allegations have
prompted the English Parliament to consider reforming their
campaign financing laws.1 The Labor Party demands that a
"' See Central Electoral Commission Approves Regulations on Financing
Election Campaigns, BBC Monitoring Service, July 31, 1995, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Allnws File.
105 See id.
106 See Text of Federal Law on Citizens' Electoral Rights, BBC Monitoring
Service, Dec. 23, 1994, art. 28, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
107 See LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 96, at 144.
10 See Tim Kelsey & David Leppard, Downing Street Alerted by M16 to Serb
Connection, SUNDAY TIMES, May 26, 1996, at 1.
109 See David Harrison & Paul Routledge, The Sleaze Factor Is Threatening
to Swamp Central Office, OBSERVER, June 20, 1993, at 19. The most well-
known foreign donors include John Latsis, a Greek shipowner, Hong Kong
billionaire Li ka-Shing, chairman of a massive property-to-communications
corporation, and Asil Nadir, a tycoon recently charged with committing fraud.
See id. Opponents recently have alleged that the Tories received large
donations between 1992 and 1994 from Serbian sources linked to Bosnian Serb
leader, Radovan Karadzic. See Kelsey & Leppard, supra note 108, at 1.
110 See British Conservatives' Election War-Chest Attacked, Reuters, May 14,
1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
. See Philip Johnston, Politics: MPs Are Split over Party Funding, THE
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 14, 1994, at 11.
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total ban on foreign contributions be enacted." 2  The Tories,
however, want to limit the proposed prohibition to funds from
foreign governments and rulers, thus excluding donations from
foreign corporations and individuals."3 While the result of this
debate remains unclear, it appears that Great Britain is likely to
follow the international trend towards limiting foreign support of
domestic candidates. Once again, a country appears to be on the
verge of raising barriers against outside influence in its domestic
political affairs.
3.2. Restrictions Used to Subvert Democratic Ideals
In certain cases, incumbent regimes appear to have enacted
limitations on political contributions in order to suppress
potential challenges to their power."' For instance, during the
late 1980s, the South African government used "certain laws
excluding foreign assistance to political campaigns . .. as part of
comprehensive strategies to prevent domestic opposition forces
from organizing and acquiring power.""' By invoking his
authority to prohibit foreign financial assistance to domestic
political organizations, former South African President P.W.
Botha prevented the United Democratic Front, the nation's major
antiapartheid movement, from receiving overseas funding. 116
Since these contributions constituted close to half of the move-
ment's budget, these measures severely limited the United
Democratic Front's activities."7  Botha justified the restrictions
by claiming that the money represented an effort by the Western
powers to infringe upon South Africa's sovereignty and that these
funds were being "'used for undermining the state and promoting
extraparliamentary politics.""'" The true motivation for the
"' See id.; Martin Linton, Dept ofFunds and Favours, THE GuARDIAN, June
18, 1993, at 22 (arguing in favor of adopting the Labor Party's proposal).
113 See Johnston, supra note 111, at 11.
114 See Damrosch, supra note 4, at 21.
115 Id.
116 See id. at 26.
17 See id. In 1988, the South African government proposed a law called the
Promotion of Orderly Internal Politics Bill which further limited foreign
funding of opposition political groups. See John D. Battersby, Pretoria May Ban
Foreign Funds for Rights Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1988, at A9.
.. John D. Battersby, Botha Says Forein Envoys Undermine Pretoria's Rule,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1987, at A3 (quoting former South African President
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prohibition, however, was to suppress the will of the people by
eliminating the opposition's access to the funding necessary to
overthrow the oppressive incumbent regime.119 Thus, instead of
promoting the democratic ideal of rule by the citizenry, limita-
tions on contributions from foreign sources can be used to subvert
this goal.
Nicaragua's experience with regulating campaign financing
provides another interesting example. During the 1984 elections,
the Nicaraguan government permitted opposition political parties
and candidates to receive money from foreign sources. 20
Government leaders hoped that this open policy would promote
international approval of the regime's legitimacy and weaken its
undemocratic and oppressive image. 121  In 1988, however, the
Sandinista leadership reversed its policy by declaring it treason for
political parties to receive overseas financial assistance."2 For-
eign political contributions were characterized as "'part of a
campaign against Nicaraguan sovereignty and integrity."")
23
Although the Sandinistas implemented this policy primarily to
prevent the U.S. government from providing financial aid, the
regulations also applied to private U.S. corporations.1 24 Again,
the real motivation for these new laws was the controlling
political party's desire to suppress popular opposition movements
and to maintain power.
P.W. Botha).
119 See Damrosch, supra note 4, at 21.
120 See id. at 27.
121 See id.
"' See Stephen Kinzer, Nicaragua Bars Funds from U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
7, 1988, at A6.
123 Id. (quoting then Nicaragan Vice President Sergio Ramirez Mercado).
Nicaraga revised this ban the following year due to its obligations under a new
regiona peace agreement. See Mark A. Uhlig, Anti-Sandinistas Wary on U.S.
Ai[d, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1989, at A5. The modification permitted acceptance
of foreign funds but required that half of the donations be retained by the
Supreme Electoral Council, an organization responsible for monitoring elec-
tions. See id.
14 In 1989, a Sandinista newspaper alleged that a U.S. construction
company had secretly delivered $500,000 to support opposition presidential
candidate, Violeta de Chamorro, thus violating Nicaraguan laws requiring such
funds to be transferred through the Supreme Electoral- Council. See Nicaragua
Says U.S. Funnelling Money to Opposition, Reuters, Oct. 10, 1989, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
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4. THE FoREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
Thus far, this Comment has only discussed legislation aimed
at limiting incoming campaign donations from foreign sources.
The United States has also enacted the FCPA, which is legislation
partly aimed at regulating the ability of U.S. corporations to fund
the campaign chests of politicians running for office in other
countries."z  This legislation resulted from investigations con-
ducted in the 1970s which revealed numerous instances where U.S.
businesses had used campaign contributions to bribe foreign
officials. 126 The FCPA attacks the problem of bribery of over-
seas officials,1" barring U.S. corporations from making campaign
contributions to foreign candidates or political parties when the
donations are, in essence, only bribes.'28 Although the FCPA
outlaws all forms of bribery of overseas officials, this Comment
focuses only on its provision outlawing illicit campaign contribu-
tions. The more general language of the statute is relevant to the
focus of this Comment, however, because it offers a unique
alternative to defining what constitutes an illegal overseas
campaign donation by barring only contributions made with a
corrupt intent. Section 5 argues that nations should abandon their
blanket prohibitions on foreign campaign contributions and
instead bar only donations that are disguised bribes.
4.1. Revelations That Led to the Adoption of the FCPA
Like § 441e, the FCPA was enacted as a result of the Water-
gate investigation into illegal corporate campaign contribu-
tions." The Watergate inquiry inspired the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") to conduct its own investigation,
which revealed not only many illegal domestic contributions, but
also numerous instances where U.S. corporations made foreign
125 See Jere W. Morehead & Sandra G. Gustavson, Complying with the
Amended Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, RISK MGMT., Apr. 7, 1990, at 76; see
generally Pamela J. Jadwin & Monica Shilling, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 31
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 677, 678 (1994) (describing the FCPA).
126 See id.
127 See id.
121 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a).
129 See Wallace Timmeny, An Overview of the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L
L. & COM. 235, 235 (1982).
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political payments.' The SEC referred to these overseas
transactions as "questionable payments," because businesses often
made them "in order to obtain and retain business overseas."13'
One may classify these transactions as international bribes. A
small percentage of these payments took the form of campaign
contributions to political candidates12
The Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the U.S.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted hearings in 1975
on the issue of foreign political payments.'33 During these
sessions, Mobil, 134 Gulf Oil,135 Exxon,'36 and Lockheed Air-
craft 37 all testified concerning their past foreign political contri-
butions.3 ' Investigators also discovered that other MNCs had
become intricately involved in the domestic politics of other
countries. For example, the International Telephone and
Telegraph Corporation ("ITT") collaborated with the CIA and
other branches of the U.S. government in a successful effort to
remove communist Salvador Allende from power in Chile.'39
Allende's intention to nationalize Chile's industries posed a
serious threat to ITT's business interests in that country.'" ITT
130 See JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at xv. Corporate executives often used
secret funds, referred to as "slush funds," to make the payments. See id. at 46-
47.
131 Timmeny, supra note 129, at 235.
132 See Morehead & Gustavson, supra note 125, at 76.
133 See JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 75.
134 Mobil funneled money to Italian political parties through its Italian
affiliate. See id. at 161.
13 Gulf Oil donated $3 million in 1970 to South Korea's Democratic
Republican Party. See id. at 107.
136 Exxon admitted to having made contributions to anti-communist Italian
parties during the 1960s and early 1970s. See id. at 108-10. Exxon funneled $29
million to these parties through its Italian subsidiary, Esso Italiana. See id. at
165-66.
137 Lockheed paid $22 million to foreign public officials and political parties
during a period of more than five years. See id. at 115. In return, Lockheed
obtained sales contracts for its aerospace products. See id. Former Japanese
Prime Minister Tanaka and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands were among
the recipients of these bribes. See id.
13 See id. at 75.
139 See F.F. SERGEYEV, CHILE: CIA BIG BUsINESS 11941 (Lev Bobrov
trans., 1981) (providing a detailed account of ITT's involvement in the
overthrow of Allende).
140 See id. at 120.
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first helped to fund Allende's opposition during the election cam-
paign.14 1 Once Allende triumphed and became president, ITT
and other MNCs which had Chilean investments worked with the
CIA to create the economic instability that provoked the 1973
military coup resulting in Allende's fall from power." This
incident demonstrates the astonishingly active role that U.S.
companies played in foreign affairs.
By October 1977, over 400 U.S. corporations had admitted to
having expended more than $300 million in questionable foreign
political payments.'43 Certain U.S. businesses had bribed foreign
public officials and tried to buy political influence in order to
protect and secure their investments abroad. Disclosures of these
bribes had precipitated the fall of certain regimes whose officials
had accepted these payments.' 44 Congress expressed concern
that these developments would undermine U.S. diplomatic
relations as foreigners began to believe that corporations manipu-
lated American foreign policy.45  Congress feared that other
countries would doubt the integrity and credibility of U.S.
corporations and would hesitate to conduct business with
them.146  These fears prompted Congress to pass the FCPA in
1977.
4.2. Provisions of the FCPA and the Requirement of Corrupt Intent
The FCPA prohibits issuers' 47 and domestic concerns
4 1
141 See id. at 123-24. The Anaconda Company, which held copper mine
shares in Chile, and other MNCs with Latin American investments also
devoted funds towards opposing Allende in the 1970 election. See id. at 14041.
142 See id. at 130-36, 140.
141 See Frederick B. Wade, An Examination of the Provisions and Standards
of the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 255, 255-56 (1982) (explaining the
origins of the FCPA).
144 See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate
Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78
GEO. L.J. 1559, 1583 (1990). The Japanese and Bolivian governments collapsed
soon after Lockheed and Gulf disclosed their past corrupt payments to officials
in these countries. See id. at 1583 n.145. The Italian government also suffered
instability when the public learned that high officials had received American
bribes. See Timmeny, supra note 129, at 237-38.
145 See Timmeny, supra note 129, at 238.
146 See id.
147 An "issuer" refers to any corporation that must register under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. 5 78c(a)(8), 781(a)-(b),
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from bribing foreign public officials, parties, or political candi-
dates.14 Although the FCPA is intended to ban bribes of all
forms, for the purposes of this Comment, the provision regarding
payments to foreign political parties and candidates is the most
pertinent:
It shall be unlawful ... to make use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly
in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or
authorization of the payment of any money, or ...
anything of value to ... any foreign political party or
official thereof or any candidate for foreign political office
for purposes of ... influencing any act or decision of such
party, official, or candidate in its or his official capacity, or
... inducing such party, official, or candidate to do or
omit to do an act in violation of the lawful duty of such
party, official, or candidate .... 150
The FCPA applies only to payments made for the purpose of
assisting the payer "in obtaining or retaining business."1"' In
addition to prohibiting direct payments, the FCPA alko prohibits
U.S. companies from making payments to a third party with
knowledge that that party will proceed to use the money to offer
a bribe.1 12 The FCPA, which is enforced by the SEC and the
U.S. Attorney General, 3 provides that a company may be fined
as much as $2 million for a violation, and individuals may be
78dd-l(a).
141 A "domestic concern" refers to any American company or individual.
See id. S 78dd-2(h).
149 See id. SS 78dd-1, 78dd-2. The FCPA also establishes certain corporate
accounting provisions aimed at increasing disclosure of corporate expenditures.
See id. S 78m; see also Jadwin & Shilling, supra note 125, at 679 (explaining the
FCPA accounting provisions).
150 15 U.S.C. S 78dd-l(a) (applying to issuers), 78dd-2(a) (applying to
domestic concerns).
151 Id.
152 See id. § 78dd-l(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3). Aperson will be held to have such
knowledge if he or she possessed actual knowledge or is found to have been in
a state of "willful blindness." See Jadwin & Shilling, supra note 125, at 682.
153 See Muffler, supra note 13, at 6.
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imprisoned for up to five years.'54
The FCPA differs from § 441e in that the FCPA is not a
blanket prohibition on all contributions to foreign political
candidates. Instead, the FCPA only bars contributions made for
a "corrupt" purpose and given with the intent of obtaining a
financial benefit. 55 In other words, a corporate officer is only
liable if he or she makes a contribution with the intent either to
wrongfully influence the candidate's actions or to induce the
candidate to misuse his or her official position once elected."5 6
Thus, it appears that in order to find the payer guilty of violating
the FCPA, there must be evidence that the payer struck some
type of corrupt quid pro quo arrangement with the recipient. 5 7
Some may argue that any individual or company which makes
a campaign contribution intends to influence the candidate and
that therefore, any contribution should be considered bribery
under the statute.5 ' There is, however, a distinction between
a legitimate campaign contribution and a bribe. One may make
a campaign contribution solely because he or she supports a
candidate's policies or ideological viewpoint. This type of
campaign contribution cannot be classified as a bribe and would
not be a corrupt payment under the FCPA. A campaign
contribution qualifies as a bribe only if the "payment [is] made to
induce the payee to do something for the payer that is improper"
or in some way forces the payee to violate his or her public
duty 59 Illicit campaign contributions are thus characterized by
154 See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c).
155 See id. % 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a).
156 See Wade, supra note 143, at 268-69 (analyzing what Congress intended
by requiring that the payment be made for a corrupt purpose).
157 See H. Lowell Brown, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Redux" The Anti-
Bribery Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 12 INT'L TAX & Bus.
LAW. 260, 267 (1994). The U.S. statute prohibiting domestic bribery of public
officials contains a similar corrupt intent requirement. See 18 U.S.C. S 201
(1988) (barring bribery of U.S. public officials); see also Jadwin & Shilling, supra
note 125, at 681 (comparing the language of the FCPA to the U.S. statute that
prohibits bribery of domestic officials).
158 See NOONAN, supra note 43, at 621-24 (discussing how a "contribution"
is sometimes difficult to differentiate from a "bribe" because one who makes a
campaign contribution often expects some type of reciprocity from thecnidate).
159 JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 90. A bribe is defined as any money
given "with a corrupt intent to induce or influence action, vote, or opinion of
person in any public or official capacity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 191 (6th
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the existence of a corrupt quid pro quo arrangement.' 6 Al-
though this may seem to be a fine distinction, it is a distinction
which allows many countries, including the United States, to
permit individuals and interest groups to contribute to campaigns
while at the same time prohibiting domestic bribery.1 6' Thus,
as a practical matter, the distinction is very real.
Section 441e and the other laws restricting donations are not
limited to barring campaign contributions from foreign nationals
who have a corrupt intent and are attempting to bribe political
candidates. Instead, these regulations are blanket prohibitions on
all foreign contributions regardless of the payer's intent.
162
Section 5 of this Comment will address the question of whether
such a broad ban should apply to foreigners while domestic PACs
and U.S. citizens are prohibited only from making illicit bribes.
4.3. The Reluctance to Address the Problem of Foreign Bribes to
Political Candidates
Although most nations at least formally prohibit bribery of
domestic government officials, no country has yet adopted
legislation resembling the FCPA to regulate illicit payments to
foreign officials.' 63 The best explanation for this is that a
country has an incentive to allow its own companies to bribe
foreign officials because this may increase the chance that domestic
companies will obtain overseas business.1" Such business will
improve the nation's trade balance and benefit the country's
ed. 1990).
160 See Brown, supra note 157, at 267. Proof of a quid pro quo arrangement
is also necessary to prosecute public officials for receiving bribes under the
Hobbs Act, a federal criminal statute prohibiting extortion of public officials.
See Peter D. Hardy, Note, The Emerging Role of the Quid Pro Quo Requirement
in Public Corruption Prosecutions Under the Hobbs Act, 28 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 409, 409-10 (1995). The Supreme Court held that a campaign
contribution violates the Hobbs Act only "if the payments are made in return
for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to
perform an official act." McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991).
161 See NOONAN, supra note 43, at 649-51.
162 See 2 U.S.C. S 441e(a).
163 See Muffler, supra note 13, at 5.
16 See Mark J. Murphy, Note, International Bribery: An Example of an
Unfair Trade Practice?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 385, 398400 (1995).
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overall economy. 16  Thus, governments often look the other
way when domestic firms secure business through corrupt
payments abroad.
66
The FCPA has remained relatively ineffective in curbing illicit
international payments because of its unilateral nature. If the
SEC or the U.S. Attorney General discovers that an American
corporation has bribed an overseas political candidate or official,
the U.S. government has no jurisdiction to prosecute the foreign
recipient. 168  The U.S. government must rely on the other
country to investigate and punish the recipient. This often may
not occur.
The international community has recognized that transnational
bribery is prevalent and that jurisdictional difficulties create the
need for some type of multinational treaty or agreement to
control the corruption. 69 Efforts at forming an international
agreement to ban bribery, however, have been relatively unsuc-
cessful thus far. In 1975, the United Nations adopted a resolution
denouncing bribery by MNCs and calling upon nations to
cooperate in order to eliminate these corrupt payments. 7 Few
member nations responded to this request.1 7' In 1976, the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") issued the OECD Declaration and Decisions on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, which
included a provision barring companies doing business in OECD
countries from offering bribes to public servants." This decla-
165 See id.
166 See id.
167 See Muffler, supra note 13, at 8 ("The FCPA's major flaw however, is
its unilateral character which limits its effectiveness in the world community.").
When the United States originally enacted the FCPA in 1977, Congress
assumed that a universal international treaty constraining bribery would likely
be established in the near future. See id. at 5-6.
168 See Jadwin and Shilling, supra note 125, at 685.
169 See Muffler, supra note 13, at 18-19.
170 See Measures Against Corrupt Practices of Transnational and Other
Corporations, Their Intermediaries and Others Involved, G.A. Res. 3514, U.N.
GAOR, 30th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3514 (1975), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 180
(1976).
171 See Muffler, supra note 13, at 10-11.
172 See id. at 9; see also Jay M. Vogelson, Corrupt Practices in the Conduct of
International Business, 30 INT'L LAW. 193, 195 (1996) (describing the OECD
provisions in the 1976 declaration).
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ration, though, was nonbinding and ultimately ineffective."'
The International Chamber of Commerce adopted rules of
conduct aimed at combatting illicit payments the following
year.174 The rules prohibited MNCs from bribing officials in
order to secure business. 75  The effectiveness of the panel
created to interpret the rules was limited, though, because its by-
laws required that it obtain the accused party's permission before
proceeding with investigations." 6
In 1993, a nonprofit organization called Transparency
International was established to encourage countries to address the
problem of bribery of foreign public officials?"' Transparency
International's goal is to have all countries enact legislation similar
to the FCPA.178 Unfortunately, countries such as Britain, Japan,
and Germany have firmly opposed the organization's efforts.
179
In Germany, bribes are still listed as a legitimate business expense
as long as the recipient is named. 180 Thus, many countries
appear content to allow international bribery to continue and to
permit their corporate agents to strike corrupt deals with public
servants.
5. A REANALYSIS OF THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
PROHIBITIONS ON FOREIGN CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
AND A PROPOSAL FOR AN ALTERNATIVE COURSE
Those who support excluding foreign financial assistance from
domestic political campaigns and the movement in the United
States towards tightening existing regulations generally offer two
justifications for such restrictions. First, they assert that these
laws are necessary to preserve a nation's right to sovereignty and
its entitlement to be free of foreign interference in its internal
173 See Muffler, supra note 13, at 9.
174 See Vogelson, supra note 172, at 195.
175 See id.
176 See id.
177 Transparency International is a coalition consisting of international
business executives, past and present government officials, and development
experts. See id. at 198 n.16.
178 See Muffler, supra note 13, at 12.
179 See id. at 13-15.
"8o See Beverley Earle, The United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and
the OECD AntiBribery Recommendation: When Moral Suasion Won't Work, Try
the Money Argument, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 207, 234 (1996).
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political affairs."' Second, they claim that these laws promote
the democratic ideals of self-determination and rule by the
citizenry."' 2 Given the increasingly global nature of the interna-
tional economy and the rise in foreign investment throughout the
world, it is time to reevaluate these traditional justifications and
reassess their legitimacy.
5.1. The Illusion of True Sovereignty in the Modern World
Most people agree that there is an international legal principle
that, to a limited extent, restricts countries from interfering in
each other's internal affairs."8 3 Numerous international treaties
and agreements have consistently established this broad principle
of non-intervention.1 4 Some may argue that this principle does
not apply to private conduct such as corporate campaign contribu-
tions. A state, however, often has an international obligation to
prevent such private conduct if the action is found to be an
international wrong because it violates the principle of sovereign-
ty.
185
The scope of this norm against foreign interference is
vague.8 6 Although the principle clearly seems to prohibit the
... See Savrin, supra note 5, at 784.
182 See id.
183 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1987).
184 See Thomas J. Jackamo, I, Note, From the Cold War to the New
Multilateral World Order: The Evolution of Covert Oerations and the Customary
International Law of Non-Intervention, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 929, 956-61 (1992)
(discussing international treaties containing provisions regarding the principle
of non-intervention). For example, the Charter of the Organization of
American States asserts that "[n]o State or group of States has the right to
intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or
external affairs of any other State." Id. at 957 (quoting Charter of the Organi-
zation of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, as
amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607,
T.I.A.S. No. 6847). The United Nations Charter focuses on deterring the use
of force by stating: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
185 See Gordon A. Christenson, The Doctrine of Attribution in State
Responsibility, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
INJURIES TO ALIENS 321, 338 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1983) (suggesting that a
state has an obligation to regulate the activities of its private actors).
186 See Jackamo, supra note 184, at 967-68 ("[T]he line separating improper,
illegal intervention from legitimate interference is quite difficult to draw.").
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unjustified use of force within the borders of another state, the
recent rise of "non-forcible forms of covert intervention such as
election campaign financing"8 7 has made the extent the custom-
ary rule pertains to these new peaceful means of interference un-
clear."8 ' The international community seems to accept and even
applaud certain nonforcible methods of intervention. For
instance, if a regime employs oppressive tactics commonly viewed
as human rights violations, other nations may legitimately respond
by implementing economic sanctions or other nonforcible reactive
measures."89 Such efforts are intended to influence the internal
affairs of the other country by inducing the tyrannical govern-
ment to cease engaging in this unacceptable conduct. Few,
though, would argue that these responses violate the other
country's sovereignty. Furthermore, states often supply financial
assistance and arms to rebels attempting to overthrow a dictator-
ship. These nonforcible measures are generally not considered a
violation of the principle of non-interference."
Nonforcible means of intervention are not limited to state
actions. With the recent surge in international investment,
overseas investors have taken a much more active role in influenc-
ing the policies and legislation of the countries in which they have
business interests.191 They have accomplished this primarily by
increasing their international lobbying efforts."
Representatives of interest groups and corporations from all
over the world regularly travel to Washington, D.C. seeking
favorable legislation.'93 The Japanese are among the most active
in this area. 94  Japanese enterprises employ former top U.S.
political consultants as their lobbyists on Capitol Hill.19
's Id. at 932.
188 See id. at 972.
189 See id. at 966.
190 Some commentators have suggested that there should be a general
"humanitarian exception" to the principle of non-intervention. See id. at 973.
This exception would justify covert actions to prevent human rights violations.
See id. at 973-74.
191 See Foreign Money, supra note 1, at 63.
192 See id. (discussing the prevalence of foreign lobbying on Capitol Hill).
193 See id.
194 See generally CHOATE, supra note 50, at 121-31 (providing a detailed
analysis of Japanese political influence in the United States).
19 See id. at 122.
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Japanese executives often threaten to reduce their U.S. investments
unless legislators adopt tax and trade policies which are beneficial
to their company's financial welfare.196 Major foreign investors
may establish a plant in a powerful congressman's district for the
sole purpose of influencing his vote. 7 In addition, foreign
corporations may join U.S. trade associations in order to influence
their lobbying efforts.198 Foreign nationals are even permitted
to contribute directly to organizations actively lobbying for an
upcoming local ballot referendum.199 These are just a few exam-
ples of the ways in which foreign businesses lobby in the United
States. The fact that the United States allows such activities and
only requires foreign nationals to register before lobbying
suggests that Americans have accepted the fact that MNCs are
entitled to express their voices and, to some extent, participate in
the political process in the United States.
International lobbying is not limited to foreign nationals
lobbying in Washington, D.C. The United States also does its
share of lobbying abroad. U.S. companies that do a significant
amount of business in Japan recently realized the importance of
establishing political ties in that country.20 1 In addition, Europe-
an lobbyists have increased their activities within the European
Community.
202
Most countries appear to accept and tolerate this recent surge
in foreign lobbying. Thus, the international norm against
intervention in another nation's affairs seems to permit such
196 See Foreign Money, supra note 1, at 67.
197 See CHOATE, supra note 50, at 134.
198 See id. at 116.
199 See F.E.C. Advisory Op. No. 1989-32, reprinted in 2 Fed. Election
Campaign Fin. Guide (CCh) 5989 (Aug. 1990) (stating that while contribu-
tions related to an election are prohibited, donations related to ballot referenda
issues are allowed).
200 See Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 22 U.S.C. %5 611-621
(19?4) (requiring foreign lobbyists to register and disclose the extent of their
activities).
201 See, e.g., Paul Addison, How TRW Plays the Lobbying Game, JAPAN
ECON. J./NIKKEI WKLY., May 19, 1990, at 6, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Allnws File (describing TRW Overseas' successful lobbying efforts in
Japan); cf Linda Sieg, Lobbying Seen as Vital for Foreign Firms in Japan, Reuters,
Jan. 7, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File (suggesting
guidelines for U.S. companies that wish to be successful lobbyists in Japan).
202 See Odile Prevot, A New Concern in Europe: Lobbyists, the Merchants of
Influence, 5 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 305 (1992).
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political activity. Why then should this norm be invoked to
justify the prohibition on foreign political contributions to
candidates? If foreign corporations can freely spend their money
to lobby domestic legislators, it seems contradictory that they
should be prohibited from spending that money to contribute to
the campaigns of these very same legislators. In both cases, the
foreign enterprise seeks to expend funds in order to affect future
domestic policies. Viewed in this light, prohibiting campaign
contributions from foreign sources appears to be an inconsistent
policy, because foreigners are allowed to exercise political
influence through various other avenues. Legislators should
reevaluate these restrictions, keeping in mind that the notion of
maintaining a state free of any foreign political influence is no
longer a realistic goal given our current global interdependent
economy and the numerous ways in which overseas interests
already employ nonforcible tactics to affect domestic politics.
5.2. Prohibitions May Not Promote Democratic Ideals
Although governments justify legislation barring foreign
campaign donations by claiming that it will promote the demo-
cratic ideal of rule by the citizenry,2 3 in reality, such bans may
not enhance true democratic rule. The South African and
Nicaraguan governments employed such campaign financing
regulations in order to prevent opposition groups from obtaining
the necessary funding to overthrow the ruling elite.2°4 This
demonstrates how oppressive regimes may use campaign financing
restrictions to suppress truly democratic movements. The United
Nations Security Council has gone so far as to authorize nations
to provide covert political financing to dissident groups attempting
to overthrow a government which consistently violates its
subjects' human rights."5
Providing financial assistance to dissident political parties and
their candidates often permits them to better express their voice
203 See Savrin, supra note 5, at 789-90 (stating that foreign contributions to
domestic campaigns undermine the right to self-determination "by allowing
candidates receiving foreign funds to broadcast their views more widely than
would be possible without the support of foreign contributors, thereby
diminishing the capacity of the electoial process to reflect solely the will of the
people").
'04 See discussion supra section 3.2.
205 See Jackamo, supra note 184, at 976.
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and challenge incumbent rulers. Thus, one may argue that such
aid actually promotes the democratic vision of providing all
citizens with equal access to the political forum.2°6  If foreign
contributions are allowed, political groups which normally would
lack the funds necessary to express their views and conduct
election campaigns may obtain this needed financing.
Proponents of maintaining prohibitions on foreign campaign
financing in the United States may respond that the above
arguments for permitting overseas assistance do not apply in this
country because the recipients of the funding generally are not
dissident groups, but instead are wealthy incumbents who are
capable of running for office with or without foreign assistance.
One may refute this argument by taking a different perspective
and contending that, regardless of whom they wish to support,
foreign interests are always entitled to the right to influence the
domestic political affairs of countries in which they have invested
tremendous amounts of money and resources.
This justification for allowing foreigners to fund political
campaigns is based on a corollary of pluralism, one of the more
modern democratic political theories. Robert Dahl, the most
famous proponent of pluralism, argues that an ideal democracy
may exist only if individuals and interest groups possess equal
opportunities to express their preferences to their political
leaders. 07 One of the ways of expressing these preferences is by
financially supporting a particular political candidate. Pluralists
stress that a true democracy permits all interested groups and
individuals to bargain and compromise in order to determine
public policy.208 Although most pluralist theorists focus solely
on providing political access to a nation's legal citizens, given the
great interdependence of foreign markets and the current global
nature of the international economy, it may be time to extend the
pluralist framework to include foreign interests.20
206 See id. at 968.
207 See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNiTED STATES 409 (4th
ed. 1981). But see Augustus diZerega, Equality, SelfGovernment and Democracy:
A Critique of Dahl's Political Equality, 41 W. POL. Q. 447 (1988) (adopting a
pluralist theory but critiquing Dahl's ideal of political equality).
208 See HARMON ZEIGLER, PLURALIsM, CORPORATISM, AND CONFUCIAN-
ISM 3 (1988).
209 See Telephone Interview with Adrian Rodriguez, doctoral degree
candidate in political science, at Rutgers University (Dec. 6, 1995).
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Foreign investors certainly have genuine concerns about
domestic policies in other countries. 210 For example, a tax
reform or a modification in trade policy could have a tremendous
financial impact on a foreign corporation. If pluralist theory
requires that an ideal democracy permit all interested groups to
express their views, then any government purporting to be
democratic must allow foreign corporations with significant
domestic operations to convey their preferences. The internation-
al community's acceptance of huge numbers of foreign lobbyists
suggests that, to some extent, the world does recognize that
foreign investors have a right to voice their views. Accordingly,
foreign investors also should be able to express these preferences
by choosing to support certain political candidates. Thus,
permitting foreign interests to fund candidates may actually
promote democratic ideals rather than subvert them.
Furthermore, many corporations feel that their significant
investments abroad entitle them to the right to influence election
outcomes and political affairs in their host countries. 21 Foreign
investment is generally quite beneficial to domestic economies: it
creates jobs, supplies capital, and often brings new technology to
existing firms. 2 2  Foreigners may indeed deserve the opportuni-
ty to influence domestic decision-making processes after bolstering
a country's economy with their investments.
5.3. A Proposal for an Alternative Course
This Comment has demonstrated that the recent international
trend has been to tighten the restrictions on campaign contribu-
tions from foreign sources.1  In the United States, legislators
are considering closing the loophole which allows foreign
companies to use their U.S. subsidiaries to contribute to U.S.
campaigns. In England, the Conservative Party is encountering
pressure to pass a prohibition barring all foreign donations. The
justifications for these policies, however, no longer appear to
apply given the growing interdependent nature of the world
210 See Savrin, supra note 5, at 808.
211 See CHOATE, supra note 50, at 121 (stating that the Japanese feel "that
their American investments give them the right to participate actively in U.S.
elections").
212 See Foreign Money, supra note 1, at 63.
211 See discussion supra sections 2.3 and 3.1.
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economy and the increasing intensity of foreign lobbying efforts.
We can no longer maintain our belief in the myth that each
nation is a sovereign state whose laws and policies affect only its
own citizens. Instead, we must acknowledge that many of these
domestic decisions produce ramifications throughout the world.
Overseas investors who have contributed large amounts of money
to their host country's economy and who can be seriously affected
by changes in policy have a legitimate right to influence their
host's decision-making processes, including its elections.
Foreign corporations should be able to contribute to a
candidate's campaign chest to the same extent as domestic
corporations can. Thus, in the United States, foreign nationals
ought to be allowed to establish their own PACs to contribute to
campaigns. Regulations preventing foreigners from funding or
directly controlling PACs should be removed. Foreign enterprises
that conduct business in countries such as Japan, where political
parties receive much of their financing from domestic compa-
nies,214 should be permitted to make political contributions. If
governments are concerned that this would result in business
exercising an undue amount of influence on the political process,
then these countries should prohibit all corporate donations,
regardless of their sources, and move towards a system of publicly
financed election campaigns.215 Allowing only domestic business
entities to contribute provides them with an unfair advantage over
their foreign competitors.
Corporations making contributions to political campaigns
should, however, be required to disclose the extent to which they
are owned by foreigners.216 Candidates have a right to know
who is funding their election campaigns. In addition, voters have
a right to know the identity of each candidate's supporters because
this may affect the candidate's agenda once elected.
Instead of adopting blanket restrictions on foreign campaign
financing, the world community should focus its attention on
reducing only those campaign contributions which, in essence,
serve as international bribes. As mentioned earlier, it is often
214 See CHOATE, supra note 50, at 28-29 (describing the reliance of Japanese
political parties on private contributions).
21 See Telephone Interview with Adrian Rodriguez, doctoral degree
candidate in political science, at Rutgers University (Dec. 6, 1995).
216 See Savrin, supra note 5, at 812-13, 816 (proposing that corporate PAC
donors be required to reveal the level of foreign ownership in their company).
[Vol. 17:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol17/iss3/6
FOREIGN CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
difficult to distinguish a legitimate campaign contribution from an
illicit bribe.1 The distinction, however, is a significant one:
campaign contributions are payments made to preferred candi-
dates, whereas bribes are corrupt payments made in exchange for
the recipient's agreement to act improperly or to violate his or
her public duty.218 Bribes are therefore distinct in that they
involve an explicit quid pro quo arrangement.219
Bribery is problematic for numerous reasons. From an
economic perspective, bribes are inefficient because they lead to
the misallocation of resources and often artificially inflate the cost
of goods."2  In addition, the revelation that certain public
officials have received kickbacks from overseas sources can
produce much political unrest. 21  Bribes also cause public
officials to place their own private interests ahead of the good of
the entire country m Bribes "undermine . . . the democratic
process and diminish the hope that the government will be
impartial and represent the interests of its citizens."' Thus,
bribes, more than any other type of transnational payment,
subvert democratic ideals by causing public officials to improperly
execute their duties.
If the world community truly wishes to promote democratic
rule and encourage officials to represent the interests of their
people, it should focus on eliminating international bribery rather
than on implementing blanket prohibitions on all forms of foreign
campaign contributions. Other countries should adopt legislation
similar to the FCPA of the United States. Even if this is
accomplished on a domestic level, however, jurisdictional difficul-
ties may render such legislation difficult to enforce internationally.
Thus, it is also necessary to develop multinational agreements
prohibiting the bribery of foreign public officials and encouraging
nations to cooperate in the enforcement of this ban. A muhilater-
al antibribery agreement with an effective enforcement mechanism
217 See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
218 See JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 90.
219 See id.
22 See Murphy, supra note 164, at 390-91.
22 See id. at 391. Brazil and Italy have recently suffered from such scandals.
See id.
2 See JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 142.
Muffler, supra note 13, at 16-17.
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will be needed to successfully resolve this serious problem.
Several scholars have advocated the establishment of such an
international agreement,2 4 and there has been some progress
towards that end.m
6. CONCLUSION
This Comment has explored and critiqued national prohibi-
tions on campaign contributions from foreign sources. Although
the United States bans donations from foreign nationals, a
loophole exists which permits foreign business entities to channel
funds through their U.S. subsidiaries. The future of this loophole
remains in doubt, as legislators recently proposed reforms which
would prevent foreigners from exercising such indirect political
influence. Other countries also restrict the inflow of political
funding from abroad, occasionally in order to suppress potential
opposition groups. Even nations that have not yet established
prohibitions, such as England, have encountered recent pressure
to enact similar bans.
These prohibitions have been justified as necessary measures to
maintain a nation's sovereignty and to permit its citizens to select
their own leaders. Proponents of these bans argue that foreigners
have no right to interfere with a country's domestic affairs. These
proponents of the prohibitions, however, seem to ignore the
realities accompanying our increasingly interdependent world
14 See JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 242 (suggesting that a multinational
"diplomatic anti-corruption policy" should be established); Muffler, supra note
13, at 4 (arguing for an international treaty intended to deter foreign corrupt
practices). The American Bar Association recently adopted a recommendation
urging the United States to encourage and support efforts by the international
community to implement mechanisms aimed at deterring corrupt practices in
the area of international business. See Vogelson, supra note 172, at 193.
See supra notes 169-80 and accompanying text. On May 27, 1994, the
OECD adopted the OECD Recommendation on Bribery in International
Business Transactions, which urges member countries to cooperate in their
efforts to combat bribery and to adopt effective measures to deter their cor-
porations from bribing foreign public officials to obtain overseas business. See
Vogelson, supra note 172, at 196-97. This Recommendation, however, is not
legally binding and merely encourages member countries to implement the
Recommendation by altering their own national laws. See Earle, supra note
180, at 225. In addition, the Justice Ministers from the Council of Europe
recently established a multi-disciplinary group to initiate research projects and
training programs aimed at deterring corrupt international payments. See
Vogelson, supra note 172, at 197.
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economy. The tremendous rise in transnational investment has
produced a comparable increase in foreign political influence.
MNCs realize that domestic laws and policies have a significant
impact on their investment returns. Thus, these MNCs have
enhanced their lobbying efforts and have sought to take advantage
of any opportunity to affect domestic decision-making. The old
model portraying each state as a sovereign and completely
independent entity has been replaced by the modern reality that
nations are dependent on each other's capital and can no longer
remain isolated from outside political influence. Nonforcible
intervention must be tolerated to some extent.
Campaign contributions are just one example of nonforcible
intervention. Foreigners who contribute to their host's economy
through investment deserve the right to attempt to influence that
country's election outcomes. If a nation permits corporations to
contribute to campaigns, foreign as well as domestic companies
should enjoy this privilege since both have comparable interests
at stake.
Instead of focusing on eliminating all foreign campaign
contributions, the international community should attempt to
prohibit only those contributions which in essence are only
bribes. International bribery is common throughout the world
and presents a significant obstacle to effective democratic govern-
ment. Reducing such corrupt payments by adopting measures
similar to the FCPA would be a much more effective way of
promoting true democratic rule.
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